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The  first  year  of  the  European  External  Action  Service  (EEAS)  has 
already  elicited  much  comment,  both  internally  and  externally.   
This contribution briefly reviews the nature of this commentary and 
then  suggests  some  possible  short-term ‘wins’  for  the  Service,  as 
well as some challenges that will require a longer-term perspective.   
The main shorter-term issue considers the need to create stronger 
linkages and priorities between existing strategies and to start the 
difficult process of melding a common mindset within the Service. 
The longer-term challenges revolve around recruitment, balance and 
resources. The latter is particularly important in order to enable the 
delegations to assume their full roles. The barrage of criticism that 
greeted the EEAS’s first birthday is also a commentary on how critical 
the role of the Service is to achieving the core goals of the Lisbon 
Treaty in external relations; namely, to aim towards more coherence, 
effectiveness and visibility. 
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Introduction
Alan  Milne  is  perhaps  best  known  for  creating Winnie  the 
Pooh. He was also a fine poet and playwright. One of his better-
known poems is ‘Now We Are Six’ which commences, ‘When I 
was one, I had just begun. When I was two, I was nearly new’. 
This is particularly appropriate when applied to the European 
External Action Service (EEAS), which, whatever its merits and 
demerits, is still very young and like Milne’s poem, real maturity 
will take several more years. This contribution will review the 
various reactions to the Service’s first year and will consider 
the implications for the second year of the EEAS, during which 
the first formal review of the functioning of the Service is due. 
Although much of the focus is on the forthcoming review, it is 
important to be sanguine about what may be accomplished in 
the shorter term and what should be considered for the longer 
term, covering the next five years or so.
The EEAS was conceived of as a quasi corps diplomatique in the 
making for the European-level of diplomacy. The basic function 
of the EEAS, going back to the Convention on the Future of 
Europe, was to help enhance the coherence, effectiveness and 
visibility of the EU’s external actions. The emergence of the 
Service was difficult and fraught with not only disagreements 
but inevitable compromise. The resulting birth was not that of 
an institution but a sui generis body with a vague mandate 
and an even more awkward initial composition, comprising 
former officials of the Commission’s Directorate General for 
External Relations, the Council Secretariat General and more 
substantial  numbers  of  national  diplomats.  The  inherent 
ambiguities  of  the  Service,  its  place  in  the  EU  institutional 
architecture  as  a ‘Service’  and  the  enormous  expectations 
surrounding the Service and its head, the High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Commission Vice 
President  (HR/VP),  perhaps  created  excessive  expectations 
that now risk being counter-balanced by undue pessimism a 
year later.
Navel-gazing
The  first  anniversary  of  the 
EEAS  was  greeted  with  a 
flurry  of  official  and  unofficial 
analyses  of  the  establishment 
of the Service and its first year in 
operation. The observations and 
suggestions  that  have  surfaced 
are numerous, but all are marked 
by the common denominator of 
recognising the extraordinary importance of the EEAS to the 
attempts to introduce more coherence, efficiency and visibility 
to the EU’s external action. Many of the analyses, inevitably, 
cast a slightly wider net and consider the other linked changes 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, such as the appointment of 
the HR/VP; the President of the European Council; and the EU 
delegations. Indeed, the analysis should properly be extended 
to  the  President  of  the  Commission  since  the  Service  is 
mandated to support all of the senior positions in EU external 
relations, as well as the Commission itself.
A joint letter from twelve foreign ministers to the HR/VP of 8 
December 2011 offered a number of suggestions designed 
to ‘further enhance the effectiveness of the EEAS and to help 
it develop its full potential’1. The building up of the Service 
was acknowledged to be a ‘complex process’ that will require 
time. The proposals included suggestions for ways to optimise 
the identification of ‘political priorities’ in the Foreign Affairs 
Council; measures to ensure that foreign policy issues are fully 
reflected  in  the  discussions  of  the  external  relations  (Relex) 
Commissioners;  measures  to  improve  internal  procedures 
including  more  manuals,  guidelines  and  common  training; 
building up the delegations ‘to their full potential’ and, finally, 
full involvement of the Member States. All of these points are, to 
varying extents, reflected in the external analyses of the EEAS.
In  the  report  by  the  High  Representative  to  the  European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 22 December 
2011, the HR/VP laid out a number of achievements of the 
young Service, notwithstanding the challenges of transition2.
There are undoubtedly positives and it is important to consider 
these as a balancer to the barrage of criticism of not only the 
Service but Ashton herself. It is, however, worth asking how 
many of the ‘positives’ (the response to the Arab Spring, the 
International Task  Force  for  Libya,  the  heightened  urgency 
of the Middle East Peace Process or the coordination of anti-
piracy efforts in the Horn of Africa) are specifically due to the 
creation of the EEAS or the wider changes instigated by the 
Lisbon Treaty. Indeed, the rudiments of many of the responses 
to international events had been established prior to the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 
The main gist of the HR/VP’s remarks concerns the changes 
wrought  by  the  Lisbon  Treaty  and  these  include  the 
assumption of the responsibilities of the rotating Presidency 
in  external  relations;  enhancing  consistency  in  EU  external 
relations; the role of the EU delegations; organisational issues 
including  staff  and  recruitment;  and  budget  and  financial 
management  issues. The  HR/VP  claims  progress  in  each  of 
these areas, but also notes substantial challenges remaining. 
The future priorities include ‘a consolidation of the capacity 
to deliver policy substance’, an emphasis on the work of the 
EU delegations; progress in building a ‘shared organisational 
culture  for  the  EEAS’  and  a  resolution  to  the  remaining 
outstanding issues in the relationship with the Commission.
The External Fascination Service
Most of these points are picked up in the external analyses, 
but  a  number  of  additional  points  of  interest  also  arise. 
For  instance,  Stefan  Lehne,  makes  a  number  of  practical 
suggestions  to  enhance  the  institutional  capacity  of  the 
EEAS,  such  as  introducing  two-level  deputies  to  the  High 
Representative, addressing the ‘semi-detached’ status of the 
crisis management bodies, greater delegation of responsibility, 
greater use of planning and option papers prepared by the 
Service and streamlining of the political dialogue mechanism. 
He notes, presciently, that any such institutional enhancements 
depend  heavily  upon  Member  States’ ‘buy  in’,  constructive 
engagement on the part of the Commission, and stronger and 
more visible leadership on behalf of the High Representative3.   
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A report by Chatham House makes a number of compelling 
suggestions for the development of the EEAS but, like Lehne, 
the authors note that, ‘The single biggest challenge for the 
next phase of the EEAS’s development is to set a clear and 
compelling  direction  for  the  medium  and  long  term,  and 
ensure that the main stakeholders are prepared to back it up 
politically, diplomatically and with the necessary resources’4. 
The  analyses  continued,  in  the  same  vein,  into  this  year. 
A  report  from  the  European  Policy  Centre  took  a  slightly 
different  approach  by  looking  at  specific  policy  areas  or 
aspects  of  them.  Their  conclusions  nevertheless  reflected 
those of other studies in terms of the need for a strategy for 
the delegations so that they might emerge as ‘fully-fledged 
political actors’ with appropriate and enhanced staffing; better 
coordination  at  all  levels  of  the  Service;  space  for ‘creative 
policy  entrepreneurship’  and,  finally,  longer-term  strategic 
thinking  on  foreign  policy  which  is  ‘not  yet  sufficiently 
reflected in the organisational structure of the EEAS’5. Steven 
Blockmans notes that the structural weaknesses that perhaps 
hinder the development of a single voice need addressing, but 
this is insufficient without more concentration on ‘passing a 
single message, in partnership with Member States and based 
on a substantial agenda’6. 
In addition to the ‘inside’ and outside reviews, David Spence’s 
contribution  deserves  special  mention  since  it  offers  a 
‘practitioner’s view’ from a recently retired EEAS, and former 
Commission  official.  His  particular  vantage  point  enables 
him to pin-point ‘an issue that dare not speak its name’ – the 
existence of varying mind-sets7.
Unsurprisingly, given the newness of the EEAS, there are plenty 
of suggestions for how to improve the EEAS with the 2013 
review in mind. Some of the suggestions are, however, clearly 
longer term in nature. This prompts the question of where 
the priorities should lie with the review in mind and what will 
need to be addressed in the longer term. Although many of 
the  reports  mentioned  above  cover  most  of  the  pertinent 
issues, they were generally not structured around shorter- and 
longer-term priorities.
Short-term wins
In this context short-term means from now until 2013 (the 
HR/VP report will be presented in September) which means 
that most of the changes suggested in the reports referred to 
above will be of a longer-term nature. 
There are a number of suggestions though which could yield 
shorter-term wins and thus boost the morale of those in the 
Service  and  its  external  standing.  The  first  is  to  capitalise 
on the presence of most of the EEAS in one location. EEAS 
officials were spread across eight locations for the first year 
of the Service’s existence, which posed obvious coordination 
challenges and was detrimental to the construction of an esprit 
de corps.  A  common  location  will  facilitate  communication 
and will contribute to a possible socialisation effect.
The  key  problems  facing  the  EEAS  are  twofold.  The  first 
concerns the general lack of strategic direction of the EU’s 
external relations and, more narrowly, the lack of vision within 
the Service. The issue, as often stated, is not so much one of a 
lack of strategy per se, but a surfeit. Reflections on the first year 
of the EEAS contained in a Chatham House Report make this 
clear when the authors observe that, ‘Beyond 134 individual 
country strategies, [the EU] has strategies for most regions 
(Central  Asia,  the  Andes,  etc.),  thematic  issues  (counter-
terrorism, non-proliferation, etc.), even whole continents (Asia, 
Africa, Antarctica)’8.
The issue then is not so much strategy per 
se,  but  the  need  for  a  clearer  connection 
between the various geographical, thematic 
and continental strategies, and importantly, 
more  sense  of  priority  that  would  lend 
real  substance  to  widely  used  but  largely 
meaningless  terms  such  as  ‘strategic 
partnerships’. The very fact that Ashton claims 
that in the period 1 January-November 2011, 
504  statements  were  issued,  including  78 
HR  declarations,  279  HR  statements,  102  Spokesperson’s 
statements and 45 local EU statements, invites an incredulous 
response – so what?9 Does this give third parties an idea of 
where the EU’s priorities are? More to the point, have the six 
reviews of a number of strategic partners (Brazil, China, India, 
Russia, South Africa and the United States) really helped clarify 
the  EU’s  strategic  interests?  Has  the  clearer  enunciation  of 
the EU’s values on the world stage, in Articles 3 and 21, of the 
Treaty on European Union significantly influenced EU external 
relations? Does the EEAS and, more generally the EU, have a 
clear idea of its ‘actorness’ (to use the political science jargon) 
on the international stage including the role and place of the 
more normative aspects? The answer in many cases is negative, 
not only because of a lack of vision within the EU, but also 
because of reluctance on the part of the Member States (some 
more than others) to embrace the EU as a strategic actor. 
Naturally, any formulation of short- to long-term objectives 
should be ‘linked to the mobilization of resources both at the 
national and the European levels’10. Although the EU’s Member 
States may lack obvious overarching external strategies, they 
are  not  trying  to  define  the  nature  and  substance  of  their 
actorness since they lack the Union’s sui generis international 
nature. The growth and development of the EEAS and the 
EU more generally will therefore depend upon what is the 
essence of the ‘distinctive European approach to foreign and 
security policy’; a claim made prematurely in the 2008 review 
of the implementation of the European Security Strategy11.
The response to the issues of strategy and vision will defy 
quick fixes, yet three shorter-term solutions might set things 
on the right track. The first suggestion is to embrace what 
Balfour et al call ‘creative policy entrepreneurship’ consisting 
of  policy  communities  around  clusters  of  issues12.  Two 
examples  would  be  development  and  conflict  prevention 
where the Commission has actively sought wide participation 
in  policy  debates,  especially  among  the  non-governmental 
organisations. Greater buy-in by the Member States could be 
sought through the involvement of think tanks, many of whom 
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enjoy the official or quasi-official blessing of the governments 
or foreign ministries in question. 
Second, the strategic planning office within the EEAS needs 
to be bolstered and this might also provide a useful role for 
a  reinvigorated  EU  Institute  for  Security  Studies,  relocated 
to Brussels. The role of the European Council should not be 
ignored, especially since a broader strategic debate seemed 
to  be  what  Herman Van  Rompuy  had  in  mind  in  February 
2010  in  his  speech  to  the  College  d’Europe.  Unfortunately, 
but understandably, this debate was curtailed by the financial 
crisis and the subsequent preoccupation with ‘gouvernement 
économique’13.  Such  a  debate  will  be  difficult,  but  it  is 
fundamental. 
Third, the starting point would be a (more) serious twofold 
review. The first should be the instigation of a comprehensive 
review  of  the  EU’s  relations  with  the  United  States,  which 
remains the EU’s only real strategic partner. The second is to 
build upon last year’s review of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy  which  was  replete  with  sensible  sounding  notions, 
like ‘deep democracy’, ‘inclusive economic development’ and 
conditionality14.  But,  these  urgently  need  substance  since 
the way in which the EU handles the aftermath of the Arab 
spring in its self-proclaimed neighbourhood will be a litmus 
test for many external partners, as will the seriousness of its 
commitments to the rule of law, effective multilateralism and 
human rights. 
The second group of shorter-term objectives arises from the 
different organisational cultures represented in the original 
configuration of the Service. The predominant ‘Relex’ culture 
tends  to  be  hierarchical  and  technocratic. 
The  former  Council  Secretariat  officials  are 
used to smaller, lighter structures and have 
more experience in working closely with the 
Member States. The Member States defy a 
common diplomatic culture, other than the 
fact that they are all national diplomats on 
temporary assignment (or seconded military 
or civilian crisis management personnel) and, 
as such, will probably place national loyalty 
to the fore. To David Spence, the success of 
the  EEAS  will  depend  upon  the  extent  to 
which EEAS officials ‘take on the mind-set of 
an integrated diplomatic service’15. Although 
changing organisational culture, or mindsets, 
will be an ongoing process, there are some shorter-term tools 
that have been put in place to begin addressing this important 
issue. Training is by no means the only one, but it has been 
frequently  mentioned  as  being  of  particular  importance  in 
this context. For instance, Spence notes that ‘Intense training, 
accompanied by retreats and other devices can reverse signs 
of regression into competing mind-sets’ 16. It is worth noting 
that training is also mentioned in the letter of twelve foreign 
ministers to the HR/VP, as well as in her response. Drawing 
upon  the  EEAS’s  training  strategy  of  2011  the  exploitation 
of the socialisation effect is only possible with concentrated 
training, especially at induction. Beyond this, there needs to 
be acknowledgement that aside from some common courses, 
training  has  to  be  tailored  to  the  specific  demands  of  the 
individual. This point was made eloquently by Lehne when 
he correctly argued that, ‘Joining the EEAS requires significant 
adjustment. Some Commission officials used to implementing 
technical programs find it difficult to get used to diplomatic 
work and the more political approach of the EEAS, just as some 
diplomats  experience  difficulties  coping  with  the  technical 
and  financial  aspects  of  the  work  of  EU 
delegations’ 17.
Longer-term challenges
Most of the issues and problems identified 
in the documents quoted above will not be 
addressed by September 2013 and the first 
major review of the EEAS. Nevertheless, evidence that reform 
has started will be a positive attribute. Some issues are more 
intractable. One of the most obvious is the composition of 
the  Service  itself  drawn  from  the  Commission,  the  Council 
Secretariat and the Member States. The effect of the current 
composition  of  the  Service  is  that  it  has  imported  some 
significant legacy problems into the Service.
The  first  is  that  the  recruitment  process  has  done  little  to 
change the geographical bias against the newer (post 2004) 
Member  States  nor,  incidentally,  has  it  addressed  the  lack 
of women at senior levels in the EEAS. Although the former 
may be explained away by the lack of diplomatic experience 
of many of these countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, the latter is harder to explain. It is therefore 
important that the EEAS should resemble the EU members if 
a sense of ownership is to evolve. At the senior level this can 
be shaped by the Consultative Committee on Appointments 
and by the High Representative herself. The overwhelming 
concentration at the senior level, especially heads of delegation 
(all EU members are now represented) has diverted attention 
from the mid-level positions which, as Hemra et al observe, is a 
‘critical layer in terms of defining the organizational culture’18.
A secondary challenge in this area is the need to create a 
level  playing  field.  Although  appointments  are  made  first 
and foremost on the grounds of merit, there are significant 
differences between equivalent experience and rank for some 
national diplomats and those who entered the Service from 
the Commission. This is a particularly vexatious issue since, 
on the one hand, strict equivalence that involves demotion 
in terms of rank for some national diplomats would clearly be 
demotivating. On the other hand, relevant prior diplomatic 
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experience  and  language  abilities  (especially  traditionally 
‘hard  languages’)  should  be  recognised.  Hence,  it  may  be 
necessary to further develop the notion of ‘merit’, including 
an understanding of equivalence and a recognition of special 
qualities where they exist, which may be of particular relevance 
to the delegations. 
The third issue of considerable importance, highlighted in all of 
the reports mentioned above, is the future of delegations. Most 
of the 140 delegations remain modestly staffed at the AD level 
(albeit with some notable exceptions), yet they are expected, 
now that they are Union delegations, to assume a greater range 
of  responsibilities  including  those  more  oriented  towards 
traditional foreign and security policy preoccupations. Given 
the economic environment in which the EEAS must operate, 
with a view to budget neutrality by the end of next year, there 
is little chance of substantially improved resources. Although 
this  is  a  serious  constraint  on  innovation,  a  more  strategic 
approach to the EU’s external role which establishes priorities, 
of the type advocated above, would help direct needs and 
resources. Similarly, more pooling and sharing of reporting 
and analysis at the national and European levels, as suggested 
by Lehne, would be of benefit not only to the delegations, 
but also to financially stressed national diplomatic services19. 
The continuing and expanded involvement of senior national 
diplomats  in  delegations  is  of  critical  importance,  in  part 
because it is more likely to encourage pooling and sharing, but 
also because it makes charges (such as those from the United 
Kingdom) of ‘competence creep’ less likely if, by so doing, they 
will  indirectly  damage  national  diplomats  assigned  to  the 
Service. 
Finally,  the  conflict  prevention,  peace-building  and  crisis 
management aspects of the EEAS remain inadequately joined 
up. Indeed the former aspects were co-developed (sometimes 
competitively) under the CFSP and Commission guises. The 
term ‘peace-building’ was a Commission term seldom heard in 
the Council Secretariat and crisis management has remained 
hobbled  by  Member  State  political  concerns  and  resource 
shortages. The choice of when and how to intervene needs to 
be more closely steered by clear strategic priorities (as argued 
above) and few crises that are likely to confront the EU are uni-
dimensional. There is a compelling need to give substance to 
the comprehensive approach to security that the EU espouses.
Conclusions
The slew of academic, media and official comment on the 
EEAS could be seen as demoralising for those in the EEAS. 
Conversely, it could be seen as recognition of the extraordinary 
importance of the support role assigned to the EEAS. These 
comments, as well as the articles cited, are offered in this spirit. 
There are no easy fixes and in all likelihood the Service will 
take years to mature and to define its space and role. Yet, as 
with any person, the early years are critical in influencing the 
paths of development in later years. Of the challenges likely 
to be faced, the most urgent is to address the organisational 
culture and mindsets of not only those in the Service and the 
EU institutions but, just as importantly, the Member States – 
especially the big three. A change of mindset will do wonders 
to aid the development of the EEAS, without it the Service’s 
development risks being stifled and the aspirations for the 
change introduced by the Lisbon Treaty – greater coherence, 
effectiveness and visibility in the EU’s external relations – will 
be lost. As in Milne’s poem, quoted at the outset, it may well 
take the EEAS six years to reach its full potential and, hopefully, 
to be ‘as clever as clever’.
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